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The paper proposes a new type of deductive database, whose structure is based on Aristotle's 
rules of the syllogism. This type of database d monstrates headvantages of Aristotelian logic 
over more modern formalisms for applications in which natural and informative interaction 
with human users is important. The structure and deductive procedures of the database are 
described and compared to other work in the area, and the unique capabilities of its user 
interaction are demonstrated by examples fi'om a session with a prototype system. 
1. Introduction 
Aristotelian logic was created for the purpose of understanding and practically guiding 
actual human thought; this was not the purpose of modern, mathematical logic. As a 
result, Aristotelian logic has some advantages over other systems of logic for applications 
in which natural and informative interaction with human users is important. The 
proposed atabase is one such application, demonstrating these advantages. 
The database holds information about a set of objects and their properties. Interaction 
with the user includes the following abilities, which are unique to this database and are 
not possible within the framework of other deductive databases: 
(1) The ability to give natural-language explanations of the deductions, constructed for 
each case in a form that fits the deduction and looks natural and convincing to the 
user. 
(2) The ability to volunteer information, in answer to yes/no questions, if a stronger or 
weaker version of the "yes" answer can be proved. 
(3) The ability to point out results that can't be proved but seem to be likely 
possibilities. 
(4) The ability, in answer to yes/no questions, to suggest "missing rules", i.e. rules that, 
if added to the database, will allow proving a "yes" answer. 
(5) The ability to suggest instances in which non-deductive forms of reasoning, such as 
analogy or induction, are likely to be useful. 
2. Structure of the Database 
The database consists of a set of constants, representing objects, and a set of relations 
(there are no functions). Information about them is expressed by specific facts, consisting 
of relations applied to constants, and by deductive rules. 
* This paper describes the author's Master's thesis, written at the Weizmann I stitute of Science, under the 
supervision ofProfessor Amir Pnueli (Mozes, 1987). 
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A unary relation can represent either a concept to which objects can belong (for 
example, "'man" or "animal") or a single possible attribute for an object (for example, 
"mortal" or "wise"). Relations with higher arities represent attributes with one or more 
measurement values (for example, "length" and "age" can both be represented as binary 
relations)t. The database contains information indicating what each relation represents, 
and also indicating some English grammatical properties of the constants and relations, 
to be used in constructing the natural-language explanations. 
A rule consists of: a "subject", which is a conjunction of one or more (perhaps negated) 
relations applied to variables and constants; a "predicate", which is a single (perhaps 
negated) relation applied to variables and constants; and a rule type, which indicates the 
type of connection between the subject and the predicate (a more general database can 
allow the predicate to be a disjunction of several relations). When writing the rule, the 
predicate is written first, then the rule type, and then the subject. 
There are four possible rule types, corresponding to Aristotle's four types of 
propositions: type A0 which asserts that all objects fulfilling the subject also fulfill the 
predicate; type E, which asserts that none of the objects fulfilling the subject fulfill the 
predicate; type I, which asserts that some of the objects fulfilling the subject also fulfill 
the predicate; and type O, which asserts that some of the objects fulfilling the subject do not 
fulfill the predicate. For example: "mortal(X) A man(X)" means that every man is mortal; 
"man(X) E dog(X)" means that no dog is a man; "mammal(X) I animal(X)" means that 
some animal is a mammal; "baby(X) A (man(X) ^  age(X,1))" means that every man with 
age 1 is a baby. 
Every rule is about something, i.e. all rule types imply that there exist some objects 
fulfilling the subject. 
There are two types of queries to the database: yes/no questions, which state a specific 
fact or a deductive rule and ask whether it can be proven true or false; and retrieval 
requests, which give a conjunction of one or more relations applied to variables and 
constants, and ask for values of the variables that fulfill these relations. 
After getting an answer to a query, the user may ask for an explanation of the 
deduction. If the query was a retrieval request, the user may specify a constant and ask 
why this constant was or was not retrieved. If the query was a yes/no question, and it 
couldn't be proven either true or false, the user may also ask for "missing rules". 
Negative information can be expressed in the database xplicitly, through rules of type 
E and O, and also through negative specific facts (i.e. asserting that a certain relation does 
not apply to a certain tuple). Relations in a rule, and in a query, can also be negated. 
Negation is expressed by the 7 character. 
In addition to proving negative knowledge explicitly, the database also uses a 
generalised form of negation as failure; negation of a fact requires both failure to prove it 
and failure to point it out as a likely possibility. The user is informed when negation as 
failure was used in proving a result. Thus~ something is false if it can be explicitly proven 
false or if there is no evidence--not even inconclusive vidence--that it is true; and the 
user knows which one it is in each case. 
Incomplete information can be expressed in the database by null values. For example, 
"length(a,nuU)" means that object a has some length, but its length is not known. This 
t The measurement values are often numerical, but not always. For example, ~'shape" can be a binary 
relation in which the measurement values are "triangular", circular", etc. 
In a more general database, there will also be relations representing relationships between objects (for 
example, "father" or "bigger" can be binary relations). See section 6. I for a discussion of how such relations are 
treated in Aristotelian logic. 
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meaning of a null value generalises naturally to all contexts in which a relation can 
appear; for example, "7  length(a,null)" means that object a does not have a length; or if 
"length(X,null)" appears in the subject of a rule (where X is a variable), the rule refers to 
all (or, if it is of type I or O, some) objects that have a length, regardless of what the 
length is. When the value of an attribute is numerical, the database allows a more general 
form of incomplete information: giving a range as the value of an attribute; for example, 
"length(a,10-30)" means that a has a length between 10 and 30. Again, the meaning of a 
range as a value generalises naturally to all contexts in which a relation can appear. 
3. Deductive Procedures 
The deductive procedures of the database are based on the theory of the syllogism, as 
developed by Aristotle (Ross, 1949) and presented in many logic textbooks, for example by 
Joseph (1916) and by Maritain (1937). Since one cannot possibly do justice to this theory 
in the following brief discussion, the reader is urged to study one of these textbooks. 
I start with explanations of some basic terms of Aristotelian logic: 
(1) Quantity--the "quantity" of a rule means whether it gives information about every 
object fulfilling the subject or only some of them. Types A and E have "universal 
quantity", I and O have "particular quantity". 
(2) Quality--the "quality" of a rule means whether it is affirmative or negative. Types 
A and I are affirmative, E and O are negative. 
(3) Term--the subject or predicate of a rule is a "term". 
(4) Distribution--a term in a rule is "distributed" if the rule gives information about 
all objects belonging to this term. The subject is distributed in rules with universal 
quantity, undistributed in rules with particular quantity; the predicate is distributed 
in negative rules, undistributed in affirmative rules. 
3.1. IMMEDIATE INFERENCES 
There are several procedures of "immediate inference", i.e. using one rule for deriving 
another rule. 
(1) Obversion--it is possible to reverse the quality of a rule and negate its predicate 
(or, if it was negated, make it positive). For example, the rule "mortal(X) A 
man(X)" (every man is mortal) can be obverted into "-7 mortal(X) E man(X)" (no 
man is immortal). 
(2) Conversion--it is sometimes possible to exchange the subject and predicate in a 
rule. This is possible in rules of type E and I; for example, the rule "mammal(X) I
animal(X)" can be converted into "animal(X) I mammal(X)". A rule of type A can 
be "converted accidentally", by turning it into an I proposition and then 
converting. 
(3) Contraposition--it s sometimes possible to exchange the subject and predicate in a 
rule and negate both of them. This is possible in rules of type A and O; for example, 
the rule "mortal(X) A man(X)" can be contraposed into "Tman(X) A 
1 mortal(X)". Contraposition is equivalent o obversion, conversion and another 
obversion. 
(4) If the subject in a rule of type I is a conjunction of several relations, the rule can be 
"partially converted" by exchanging one of these relations with the predicate. 
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It is also sometimes possible, from the truth or falsity of one rule, to deduce the truth or 
falsity of another ule with the same terms and a different ype, as follows: 
(1) Types A and E are "contraries", i.e. they can both be false but they can't both be 
true. 
(2) Types I and O are "sub-contraries", i.e. they can both be true but they can't both 
be false. 
(3) Types A and O are "contradictories", i.e. always exactly one of them is true and the 
other false. Types E and I are also contradictories. 
(4) Type I is a "subaltern" of type A, i.e. it is impossible for A to be true and I to be 
false. Also, type O is a subalterr~ of type E. 
Widening or narrowing a term 
There are three cases in which we say that one term is "wider" than another term. 
(1) A conjunction of several relations is narrower than a term that contains only one, 
or only part, of these relations. 
(2) A term in which one value of a non-negated (negated) relation is a numerical range, 
is wi~ter (narrower) than a similar term in which there is in the same place a 
narrower ange or a constant from that range. 
(3) A term in which one value of a non-negated (negated) relation is a null value, is 
wider (narrower) than a similar term in which there is in the same place a constant 
or a numerical range. 
A combination of several such differences, in the same direction, is also possible. 
Any undistributed term can be replaced by a wider term. For example, from the rule 
"idiot(X) I (man(X) ^  age(X,30-50))" (some man with age between 30 and 50 is an idiot) 
we can deduce the rule "idiot(X) I (man(X)A age(X,20-60))", or the rule "idiot(X) I 
man(X)". 
Any distributed term can be replaced by a narrower term, if we know that there exist 
some objects fulfilling the narrower term. For example, from the rule "mortal(X) A 
man(X)" we can deduce the rule "mortal(X) A (man(X) ^  age(X,30-50))". 
3.1.1. 
3.2. SYLLOGISMS 
A syllogism is a deduction of a new rule from two previously known rules. 
For purposes of the syllogism, a specific fact can be regarded as a rule in which the 
constant values are the subject. For example, "Man(Socrates)" can be regarded as a rule 
of type A in which the subject is "Socrates(X)" and the predicate is "Man(X)". In the 
same way, every positive fact can be regarded as a rule of type A, and every negative fact 
as a rule of type E. 
There are three sorts of restrictions a syllogism must fulfill to be valid--"terminological 
restrictions", dealing with the terms appearing in the syllogism; "qualitative restrictions", 
dealing with the quality of the premises and the conclusion; and "quantitative 
restrictions", dealing with the quantity of the premises and the conclusion and with the 
distribution of the terms. 
3.2.1. Terminological restrictions 
There must be exactly three terms in the premises and the conclusion, each one 
appearing twice. The subject of the conclusion is the "minor term"; the predicate of the 
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conclusion is the "major term"; and the third term, which appears only in the premises, is 
the "middle term". The premise in which the minor term appears is the "minor premise", 
and the premise in which the major term appears is the "major premise". 
If the subject of the major premise is a conjunction of several relations, and some of 
them are predicates of true type A rules in which the minor term is the subject, then they 
can be ignored for the purposes of this syllogism. For example, if the minor premise is 
"age(Joe, l)", the major premise is "baby(X) A (man(X)^ age(X,0-2))", and "man(Joe)" 
is true, then the relation "man(X)" in the major premise can be ignored, i.e. the major 
premise can be treated in th'is syllogism as if it was "baby(X) A age(X,0-2)" (and from 
this, as described in section 3.1.1, we can deduce "baby(X) A age(X,1)"; this creates a 
valid syllogism with the conclusion "baby(Joe)"). 
3.2.2. Qualitative restrictions 
(1) At least one premise must be affirmative. 
(2) If both premises are affirmative, the conclusion should also be affirmative. 
(3) If one premise is negative, the conclusion should also be negative. 
3.2.3. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Quantitative restrictions 
Any term that is undistributed in the premises must also be undistributed in the 
conclusion. 
The middle term must be distributed in at least one premise. 
At least one premise must be universal. 
If one premise is particular, the conclusion should also be particular. 
Quantitative restrictions 3 and 4 are not independent, but can be deduced from the 
others. 
3.3. CAPABILITIES OF THE USER INTERACTION 
Use of the above procedures allows the following unique capabilities in interaction with 
the user: 
3.3.1. Natural-language explanations 
Aristotle made two main classifications of the various syllogisms: 
(1) Moods. The mood is determined by the types of the two premises. If both premises 
are of type A, the syllogism is of mood AA; if the major premise is of type E and the 
minor premise of type I, the syllogism is of mood EI; etc. 
(2) Figures. The figure is determined by the place of the middle term in the premises. If
the middle term is predicate of the minor premise and subject of the major premise, 
the syllogism is of the first figure; if the middle term is predicate of both premises, 
the syllogism is of the second figure; if the middle term is subject of both premises, 
the syllogism is of the third figure.t 
According to Joseph's analysis (and contrary to Aristotle's own views), each of 
the figures represents a different ype of reasoning: the first figure represents direct 
reasoning, based on the principle that whatever satisfies the condition of a true rule 
t There is some controversy among logicians about the existence of a fourth figure, but it isn't important for 
our purposes; see Joseph (1916) or Maritain (1937) for details. 
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falls under the rule; the second figure represents indirect reasoning, by reductio ad 
absurdum; the third figure represents demonstrating existence by an example. 
Using these two classifications, it is easy to construct, for each deductive step, a 
natural-language s ntence xplaining it that looks natural and convincing to a human 
user; these sentences are used to give a full natural-language explanation of the deduction. 
For example, a syllogism of mood AA, first figure will be explained by a sentence of the 
form "Because S is M, it is P"; a syllogism of mood EA, second figure will be explained 
by a sentence of the form "S can't be P, because then it wouldn't be M"; a syllogism of 
mood AA, third figure will be explained by a sentence of the form "Some S is P; for 
example M"; etc. The form is filled in by each of the three terms, according to its type 
(constant or relation, concept or attribute) and its grammatical properties (such as its 
plural form and the pronoun that can stand for it). See section 5 for examples of such 
sentences. 
Note that the four types of rules allow representing each piece of knowledge in its most 
natural form, and this helps in constructing good explanations. For example, suppose you 
want to represent the information that only a man can be responsible-~. In most deductive 
databases, or in the PROLOG language, this would be represented by the rule 
"'man(X):--responsible(X)"; similarly, it is possible to represent his knowledge in the 
proposed database by the rule "man(X) A responsible(X)". But this is clearly an 
unnatural form for this rule. The natural expression of this information in English is not 
"every responsible being is a man", but "only a man can be responsible"; and there is a 
reason for this--its natural use is not to conclude that someone is a man because you 
know that he is responsible, but to conclude that something (for example, your cat) is not 
responsible because you know that it's not a man. The proposed database gives us a 
natural way to express this rule: "responsible(X) E 7 man(X)". This form is equivalent to 
the previous one in the results you can deduce from it, but it will produce different, and 
better, natural-language explanations for the deductions. 
3.3.2. Stronger or weaker esults 
It is possible that a user, in a yes/no question, asked about a rule with universal 
quantity (i.e. of type A or E), and the database, while unable to prove it, was able to 
prove a corresponding rule with particular quantity. It is also possible that the user asked 
about a rule with particular quantity and the database was not only able to prove it but 
also able to prove a corresponding rule with universal quantity. In both cases, this 
information can be volunteered to the user. 
3.3.3. Pointing out likely possibilities 
According to the list of restrictions on valid syllogisms, invalid syllogisms can be 
classified by the failures that they commit, i.e. by the restrictions that they violate. 
In particular, let us look at syllogisms that violate quantitative r striction 2 (and maybe 
also 3 or 4). Such syllogisms commit the "fallacy of the undistributed middle", i.e. the 
middle term is undistributed in both premises. This is a fallacy because, since each 
premise refers to only some of the objects belonging to the middle term, we cannot be sure 
that they refer to the same objects, and, therefore, we are not sure that the middle term 
performs its job of linking the two terms of the conclusion. 
t The word "man", of course, is used here in the generic meaning, which includes both sexes. 
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However, while we cannot be sure that both premises refer to the same part of the 
middle term, it is possible that they do. This means that, if a conclusion was reached by 
committing the fallacy of the undistributed middle once, and no other fallacy, and the 
undistributed middle term is not negated (i.e., it refers to the objects that belong to some 
specified concept or have some specified attributes), then we do have some, inconclusive, 
evidence for the truth of the conclusion; in that case, the conclusion should not be 
presented as proven, but can be pointed out as a likely possibility. 
3.3.4. "'Missing rules" 
The database can use a chain of syllogisms of any length in reaching a conclusion. In 
trying the possibilities for such chains, some paths are found not to lead to a valid proof. 
The restrictions on valid syllogisms can be used, at the end of such a chain, to find 
whether some additional rule, consistent with the other rules in the database, would, if 
added to the database, allow creating a valid prooft. These "missing rules" can then be 
reported to the user. 
Reporting of such a "missing rule" can be useful if the user was assuming this rule to be 
true, or knew it to be true, but it was not specified in the database. It is also useful if the 
"missing rule" is a stronger version of a rule known to be true, or if there exists some 
inconclusive vidence that it is true. 
3.3.5. Suggesting instances for non-deductive r asoning 
As explained above, a result can be suggested as a likely possibility if it is the 
conclusion of a syllogism committing the fallacy of the undistributed middle. Sometimes, 
that invalid syllogism is in the first figure, and its major premise is itself the conclusion of 
a valid syllogism in the third figure (see, for example, the suggestion of Fido as a possibility 
in example 1 in section 5). In such a case, this is a simple form of reasoning by analogy. 
Also, when a conclusion is reached by a valid syllogism in the third figure, that 
conclusion always has particular quantity, and the syllogism suggests the possibility of 
establishing a stronger version (i.e. the corresponding rule with universal quantity) by 
inductionS. 
4. Comparison to other work 
4.1. OTHER WORK ON DEDUCTIVE DATABASES 
The general structure of the database is similar to that described by Gallaire et al. 
(1978; 1984); one difference is that, instead,of only one type of rule (implication), the 
database allows four types (of these, A is the closest in its meaning to implication, but is 
not exactly the same since it implies that there exist some objects fulfilling the subjectw 
~- Such incomplete paths, handled in this way, are known in Aristotelian logic as "enthymemes". 
:I: Such induction ismade more plausible when we can find more such syllogisms with the same conclusion but 
with different middle terms. It is the task of inductive logic, and outside the scope of the database, todetermine 
when we can be certain that the induction isjustified. 
w This implication is consistent with the way people naturally think; today, people with a background in
modern formal logic reject i  theoretically, but s~ill use it in everyday reasoning. See Veatch (1952, pp. 243-263), 
Maritain (1937, pp. 225-233), or the full thesis (Mozes, 1987, pp. 22-23) for more details on the rationale of 
this implication. 
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The structure is similar to what Gallaire et al. (1984) refer to as "definite deductive 
databases", i.e. the predicate must be a single relation. 
The treatment of negative information is also different. The databases described by 
Gallaire et al., as well as conventional relational databases and logic-programming 
languages uch as PROLOG, use only negation as failure. In contrast, the proposed 
database allows expressing and proving negative knowledge explicitly, avoiding non- 
monotonicity and the need for assuming complete knowledge; and it also uses a 
generalised form of negation as failure. 
In its scope and the type of information it contains, the proposed atabase is similar to 
Lipski and Marek's "information storage and retrieval systems" (Lipski & Marek, 1977; 
Lipski, 1979). One difference is that, in Lipski and Marek's system, each attribute must be 
defined over all objects. In the proposed system, this assumption is not made; whether 
an attribute is defined over an object is itself a piece of information that the database may 
contain (for unary relations, this is the only information; for higher arities, this 
information is expressed by null values). The allowed type of incomplete information is a 
slightly restricted version of that allowed by Lipski. 
However, the most important difference is in the motivation. Most previous work on 
deductive databases concentrated on technical issues of completeness and expressive 
power, or on issues of efficiency. In contrast, the main motivation of this paper is 
improving the interaction with the user. 
4.2. OTHER WORK ON ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC 
Aristotelian logic was used only once before in any application in computer science--in 
KONSDED, an inference ngine used for consistency-checking and deduction of new 
relationships in the knowledge-base of the medieal expert system CADIAG-1 (Barachini, 
1984; F. Barachini, personal communication, 1985; K.-P. Adlassnig, personal 
communication, 1985). However, this use of Aristotelian logic is in a part of the system 
that does not interact with the user (in the inference ngine, rather than in the explanation 
facility where it could have been of value), and it therefore does not demonstrate the 
strong points of Aristotelian logic; as a result, it had no special advantage over more 
modern formalisms, and later versions of KONSDED were modified to use predicate 
calculus (Adlassnig et al., 1985). 
Aristotelian logic is also mentioned in a recent paper about the binary set containment 
inference problem (Atzeni & Parker, 1986). The authors see the possibility of using 
Aristotelian logic for the binary set containment inference problem (which uses 
propositions of the four types, only with unary relations, with only one relation in the 
subject, and with no constants), but, again, don't see any special advantage in it over 
predicate calculus, or its use for interaction with human users. 
5. Examples 
A prototype of the proposed atabase was developed and tested successfully, and has 
demonstrated all the unique capabilities claimed above. Following are some examples 
from a session with this prototype system. 
In the following examples, text in curly braces explains the meaning of rules and 
queries, and is not part of the session. 
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The contents of the database during the session were: 
SPECIFIC FACTS; 
man(Socrates) 
wise(Socrates) 
man(Joe) 
age(Joe,l) 
man(John) 
age(John,15) 
man(Peter) 
age(Peter,40) 
dog(Fido) 
work of art(MonaLisa) 
RULES: 
predicate rule-type subject 
animal(X) A man(X) {Every man is an animal} 
animal(X) A dog(X) {Every dog is an animal} 
mortal(X) A man(X) {Every man is mortal} 
mortal(X) E work of art(X) {No work of art is mortal} 
man(X) E dog(X) {No dog is a man} 
responsible(X) E n man(X) {No non-man is responsible} 
responsible(X) A wise(X) {Everyone who is wise is 
responsible} 
responsible(X) E baby(X) {No baby is responsible} 
responsible(X) I adult(X) {Some adult is responsible} 
responsible(X) E idiot(X) {No idiot is responsible} 
age(X,0-120) A man(X) {Every man has age 0-120} 
baby(X) A (man(X) ^  age(X,0-2)) {Every man with 0-2 is a 
baby} 
adult(X) A (man(X) A age(X,21-120)) {Every man with age 21-120 is an 
adult} 
idiot(X) I (man(X) ^  age(X,30-50)) {Some man with age 30-50 is an 
idiot) 
EXAMPLE 1 
> mortal(X) /x ~ responsible(X) {find an object which is mortal and not responsible} 
Joe 
By negation as failure: John 
Possibility: Fido 
> Explain Joe 
Because Joe is a man, he is mortal. 
Because Joe is a man with age 1, he is a baby. 
Because Joe is a baby, he is not responsible. 
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> Explain Fido 
Because Fido is a dog, it is an animal. 
Some animal is mortal; for example, the men. 
Because Fido is an animal, it is, perhaps, mortal. 
Because Fido is a dog, it is not a man. 
Because Fido is not a man, it is not responsible. 
> Explain Socrates (why wasn't Socrates retrieved?} 
Because Socrates is wise, he is responsible. 
> Explain Peter {why wasn't Peter retrieved?} 
Because Peter is a man with age 40, he is an adult. 
Because Peter is an adult, he is, perhaps, responsible. 
EXAMPLE 2 
> 7 man(X) {Find an object which is not a man} 
Fido, Mona_Lisa 
> Explain Fido 
Because Fido is a dog, it is not a man. 
> Explain Mona_Lisa 
Because Mona Lisa is a work of art, it is not mortal. 
Mona Lisa can't be a man, because then it would be mortal. 
EXAMPLE 3 
> age(Socrates,?) {What is Socrates's age?} 
Range 2-t20 
> Explain 
Because Socrates is a man, he has age in range 0-120. 
Because Socrates is wise, he is responsible. 
Socrates can't be a baby, because then he wouldn't be responsible. 
Socrates can't have age in range 0-2, because then he would be a baby. 
EXAMPLE 4 
> mortal(X) A animal(X) {Is every animal mortal?} 
Unknown. But it is known that some animal is mortal. 
It may be possible to establish by induction that every animal is mortal. 
> Explain 
Some animal is mortal; for example, the men. 
> Missing 
No possible addition of a rule can establish your conclusion. 
EXAMPLE 5 
> man(X) A animal(X) {Is every animal a man?} 
No. 
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> Explain 
Some animal is not a man; for example, the dogs. 
EXAMPLE 6 
> wise(X) A (man(X) ^  age(X,30-90)) (Is every man with age between 30 and 90 wise?} 
No. 
> Explain 
We know that some man with age in range 30-50 is an idiot. 
Because he is an idiot, he is not responsible. 
He can't be wise, because then he would be responsible. 
EXAMPLE 7 
> work of art(X) E animal(X) {Is no animal a work of art?} 
Unknown. But it is known that some animal is not a work of art. 
> Explain 
Some animal is mortal; for example, the men. 
It can't be a work of art, because then it wouldn't be mortal. 
> Missing 
Can establish your conclusion if you add the rule: 
mortal(X) A animal(X) 
6. Applicability of Aristotelian logic 
To my knowledge, the best detailed presentation of the philosophical base of 
Aristotelian logic, and of the basic reasons for its advantages over modern, mathematical 
logic, is by Veatch (1952). The full thesis (Mozes, 1987) contains a discussion of the 
philosophical issues, based on Veatch's book. 
6.1. POSSIBLE EXTENSION: RELATIONS REPRESENTING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN OBJECTS 
The common view about relations representing relationships between objects, e.g. 
"father" or "bigger", is that facts and inferences involving such relations are a different 
form of reasoning than the classical subject-predicate propositions and syllogisms. Some 
mathematical logicians regard the syllogism as reasoning with unary relations; others 
regard it as a special case of reasoning with transitive relations (i.e., a syllogism of the 
form "every a is b; every b is c; therefore very a is c" is regarded as isomorphic to 
arguments like "a is bigger than b; b is bigger than c; therefore a is bigger than c"); but all 
agree that the syllogism is only one special case of deductive reasoning. The database 
described in this paper would therefore be criticised as limited to only one form of 
deduction. 
However, an examination of the way relationships between objects are treated in actual 
human thought would show that there are no special problems in extending this database 
to deal with such relations.t 
t The following is based on Veatch's (1952) discussion, particularly pp. 344-358; the main points were 
already recognised byAristotle, and are also mentioned byJoseph (1916, pp. 341-342). 
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Suppose that, in a more general version of our database, we have the relation "bigger", 
and want to express the fact that it is transitive; this would be expressed as "bigger(X,Y) 
A (bigger(X,Z) ^  bigger (Z,Y))". If we also have the facts "bigger(a,b)" and 
"bigger(b,e)", we can use them to conclude "bigger(a,e)". Is this a different form of 
reasoning than the syllogism? 
"Bigger(X,Y) A (bigger(X,Z) ^  bigger(Z,Y))" is a rule about relational complexes, i.e. 
about objects related to one another in certain ways; it states that any relational complex 
consisting of three objects uch that X is bigger than Z and Z is bigger than Y, will also be 
such that X is bigger than Y. This rule was used as a premise, together with the other 
premises that told us the relational complex of a, c and b fulfills the condition, to conclude 
that it also has the property that a is bigger than e. 
This means that the inference is a syllogism; it has exactly the same form as concluding 
"mortal(Socrates)" from "mortal(X) A man(X)" and "man(Socrates)", and the only 
difference is that the minor term is a relational complex rather than a single object. The 
same is true of any such inference, including inferences with relations of arities larger than 
2. 
As described in section 3.2, specific facts are regarded, for purposes of the syllogism, as 
rules in which the constant values are the subject. Note that exactly the same can be done 
in reasoning about relational complexes. For example, the fact "bigger(a,b)" can be 
regarded as a rule of type A in which the subject is the tuple "a,b" and the predicate is 
"bigger". 
We see, therefore, that the rules of the syllogism, as used in the database described in 
this paper, are an appropriate general model for deductive inference. A more general 
database, which would allow knowledge and inference about relational complexes, will, of 
course, be able to express a wider range of facts, and may present some interesting 
problems in its implementation, but it will not add any new theoretical aspects or 
problems relevant to logic. 
6.2. AREAS oF APPLICABILITY 
The advantages of Aristotelian logic demonstrated above are based on its 
correspondence to actual human thought. This suggests two broad areas to which 
Aristotelian logic can be applied: 
(1) Applications in which interaction with human users is important. 
(2) AI applications, which are concerned with simulating human thought, and in which 
some of the capabilities described above, such as suggestion of likely possibilities 
and connection to induction, are important. 
This paper is concerned mainly with area 1. Aristotelian logic has so far received no 
attention from computer scientists in these areas (as I mention above, the only previous 
works in computer science using Aristotelian logic are KONSDED and the binary set 
containment inference problem, which do not belong to either of the two areas). 
A third area, on which many applications of logic in computer science have so far 
concentrated, is mathematical theorem-proving. In this area, the special capabilities made 
possible by Aristotelian logic are not important. Some features of theorem-proving 
systems, such as functions, would probably be hard to fit into the framework of 
Aristotelian logic. The procedures presented in section 3 are more complex than those of 
other logic programming systems, and any implementation f them will probably be less 
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efficient; also, the treatment of explicit negation in these procedures i not complete (see 
example in section 7.2). For these reasons, Aristotelian logic will probably not be useful 
for mathematical theorem-proving systems. 
7. Aristotelian Logic as an Extension of Other Deductive Databases 
The deductive procedures of this database, which are based on Aristotelian logic, as 
described in section 3, are very different from those of Gallaire et al. (1984), or of logic- 
programming languages uch as PROLOG, and it may not be clear how they can be 
compared. Two questions that will make this comparison clearer are: 
(1) Can we create a system of rules for deduction that will be an extension of logic 
programming and will provide the same deductive powers as the Aristotelian-logic 
database? 
(2) Can we give a formal semantics for the database that will look like an extension of 
the "model-theoretic" semantics of other deductive databases or of PROLOG? 
7.1. A SYSTEM OF RULES FOR VALID INFERENCE 
Several logicians have created "axiomatisations" of Aristotelian logic, i.e. reduced it to 
a compact set of rules for deduction. The first, and best-known, axiomatisation is by 
Lukasiewicz (1951); more recently, Atzeni & Parker (1986) also gave such an 
axiomatisation. All these axiomatisations dealt with a special ease: only one relation in 
the subject, and no constants. 
Following is a similar axiomatisation, a system of eleven rules, which also deals with 
the case of several relations in the subject and with constants. It is an extension of logic 
programming in two (orthogonal) directions--explicit negation, and particular 
quantity--and is equivalent, for the purposes of valid inferences, to the procedures 
described in section 3. 
The system is given in terms of types A and I; we can get the equivalent of types E and 
O by negating the predicate. The 7 character is used for negation and for cancellation of 
a negation (i.e., 7 ~ P is the same as P). 
The system deals only with unary relations. As discussed in section 6.1, the extension to 
higher arities does not add significant new aspects or problems; it can be done by: 
a. using a tuple of variables in the place of one variable, and b. using a higher-arity 
relation with specified values in one or more of the places as a lower-arity relation (see the 
example below of the relation "age_0 to 2"), 
The rules are: 
(1) If P,M1 . . . . .  Mj are relations or their negations, and s is a constant, then from 
P(X) A (M~(X) ^  . . .  ^ Mj(X)) 
Mr(s) 
Mj(s) 
we can deduce 
V(s) 
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(2) I f  P ,M 1 . . . . .  Mj ,  S t . . . . .  S k are relations or their negations, then from 
P(X) A (M~(X) A . . .  A Mj(X)) 
M~(X) h (St(X) A . . .  ^ Sk(X)) 
M~(X) h (St(X) A . . .  A Sk(X)) 
we can deduce 
P(X) A (St(X) ^ . . .  A Sk(X)) 
(3) I f  P and S are relations or their negations, then from 
e(x)  A S(X) 
we can deduce 
7 s(x)  A ~ P(X) 
(4) I f  M ,P t , . .  ",PI are relations or their negations, s is a constant, and 1 ~< k ~< j, then 
f rom 
M(X) A (PI(X) A . . .  ^ P~(X)) 
M(s) 
PI(s) 
Pk-  1 (S) 
Pk + t (S) 
we can deduce 
Pt(s) 
-n Pk(s) 
(5) I f  M,Pt  . . . . .  Pj,St . . . .  ,S t are relations or their negations, and 1 -N< k < j, then from 
M(X) h (Pl(X) A . . .  A Pj(X)) 
we can deduce 
7 M(X) A (St(X) A . . .  A SI(X)) 
PdX)  a (s l (x)  ^ . . .  A S,(X)) 
Pk- l (X)  A (SI(X) A . . .  A Sl(X)) 
Pk+I(X) A(S I (X  ) A . . .  A Sl(X)) 
Pj(X) A (SI(X) A , , ,  A Sl(X)) 
- IPk(X )A(S I (X  ) A . . .  A Sl(X)) 
(6) I f  P,St . . . . .  Sj are relations or their negations, then from 
P(X) A (St(X) ^ . . .  ^ Sj(X)) 
we can deduce 
P(X) I (s l (x)  A . . .  ^ Sj(X)) 
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(7) If P,S1,...,Sj are relations or their negations, and 1 ~< k -%j, then from 
P(X) I (SI(X) A . . .  ^ Sj(X)) 
we can deduce 
SR(X) I (P(X) A SI(X) ^ . . .  ^ Sk-I(X) A Sk+I(X) ^  . . .  ^ Sj(X)) 
(8) If P,S1 . . . . .  Sj are relations or their negations, and m is a constant, then from 
P(m) 
Sl(m) 
Sj(m) 
we can deduce 
P(X) I (SI(X) ^ . . .  A Sj(X)) 
(9) If P,M 1 . . . . .  Mr,S1,...,Sj are relations or their negations, then from 
P(X) I (M~(X) A . . .  A Ml(X)) 
Sl(X) A (MI(X) ^ . . .  ^ MI(X)) 
we can deduce 
Sj(X) A (M~(X) a . . .  ^ MI(X)) 
P(X) I (SI(X) ^ . . .  ^ Sj(X)) 
(10) If P,S 1 ..... Sj are relations or their negations, and 1 ~< k ~<j, then from 
P(X) I (SI(X) ^ . . .  ^ Sj(X)) 
we can deduce 
P(X) I(SI(X) A . . .  A Sk_l(X ) A Sk+I(X ) A . . .  A Sj(X)) 
(11) If P,S~,...,Sj are relations or their negations, then from 
P(X) A (S~(X) A . . .  ^ Sj_~(X)) 
Sj (X)  I (S l (X )  A , , .  ^ Sj_l(X)) 
we can deduce 
P(X) A (Sl(X) ^ . . .  ^ S~(X)) 
1 is identical to the deductive procedures of Gallaire et aL, and of logic-programming. 
In order to be able to make queries about deductive rules (which is not allowed by 
Gallaire et al. or by logic-programming languages, but is allowed by this database) we 
need an equivalent of 1 for deductive rules; tfiis is 2. 3, 4 and 5 are the extension for explicit 
negation; 5 is the equivalent of 4 for deductive rules. 6 thru 11 are the extension for 
particular quantity; 9 is the equivalent of 8 for deductive rules; 10 and 11 deal with 
widening and narrowing terms, as described in section 3.1.1. 
7.1.1. Examples of deductions with this system 
Following are some examples of deductions with the above system, showing the 
compatibility between its deductive powers and those of the database. The examples are 
taken from section 5. 
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To prove "7 man(Mona_Lisa)" (example 2): 
statement 
(1) work of art(MonaLisa) 
(2) -Tmortal(X) A work of art(X) 
(3) mortal(X) A man(X) 
(4) 7 mortal(Mona_Lisa) 
(5) -~ man(X) A 7 mortal(X) 
(6) -7man(Mona Lisa) 
justification 
stored fact 
stored rule 
stored rule 
by rule 1 from (1) and (2) 
by rule 3 from (3) 
by rule 1 from (4) and (5) 
To prove "7 age_0_to_2(Socrates)" (example 3): 
statement 
(1) man(Socrates) 
(2) wise(Socrates) 
(3) responsible(X) A wise(X) 
(4) 7 responsible(X) A baby(X) 
(5) baby(X) A (man(X) ^  age_0_to 2(X)) 
(6) responsible(Socrates) 
(7) 7 baby(X) A responsible(X) 
(8) 7 b'aby(Socrates) 
(9) -7 age_0_to 2(Socrates) 
To prove '~ work of art(X) I animal(X)" (example 7): 
statement 
(1) animal(X) A man(X) 
(2) mortal(X) A mart(X) 
(3) -7 mortal(X) A work of_art(X) 
(4) animal(X) I man(X) 
(5) animal(X) I mortal(X) 
(6) -7 work of art(X) A mortal(X) 
(7) animal(X)I 7 work of art(X) 
(8) 7 work of art(X) I animal(X) 
justification 
stored fact 
stored fact 
stored rule 
stored rule 
stored rule 
by rule 1 from (2) and (3) 
by rule 3 from (4) 
by rule 1 from (6) and (7) 
by rule 4 from (1), (5) and (8) 
justification 
stored rule 
stored rule 
stored rule 
by rule 6 from (1) 
by rule 9 from (2) 
by rule 3 from (3) 
by rule 9 from (5) 
by rule 7 from (7) 
and (4) 
and (6) 
As can be seen in these examples, the structure of the deduction is lost in the use of the 
above system. The classification of syllogisms into figures is not possible; and if the 
validity of a syllogism is determined by the possibility of reducing it to the eleven rules, 
rather than by the list of restrictions presented in section 3.2, then the classification of 
fallacies is also not possible. This means that the system captures the deductive powers of 
the database, but not its special capabilities. 
7.2. A PARTIAL fORMAL SEMAN'rms 
Following is a partial formal semantics for the database. It provides a definition for 
consistency and semantic implication, but does not express the special capabilities of the 
user interaction. 
This semantics, like the system in section 7.1, deals only with unary relations. Also, it 
deals only with types A and I. 
Definition: Let F~ be a set of specific facts, and let F0 be a set of deductive rules. The 
"closure" of F~ with respect o Fo is a superset of F s obtained as follows: 
(1) For each rule of type I in F 0, if F~ doesn't already contain an instance of it--i.e, no 
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constant is known to fulfill both its subject and its predicate--then add a new 
constant and add specific facts asserting that it fulfills both the subject and the 
predicate of the rule. 
(2) For each rule of type A in Fg, if no constant is known to fulfill its subject, then add 
a new constant and add specific facts asserting that it fulfills the subject of the rule. 
(3) For each relation appearing in any rule in Fa, if no constant is known not to fulfill 
it, then add a new constant and add a specific fact asserting that it does not fulfill 
this relation. 
(4) If there exists a rule of type A in Fa and a constant s such that s is known to fulfill 
the subject of the rule but no specific fact asserts that it fulfills the predicate, then 
add a new specific fact asserting that s fulfills the predicate of the rule. 
(5) Repeat step 4 until no such rule and constant can be found, i.e. all direct 
applications of type A rules have been generated explicitly. 
Step 2 is required because of the assumption that every rule is about something. Step 3 
is required to prevent relations that include everything (which is not allowed by the 
theory of the syllogism). 
DEFINITION: A set of specific facts is "consistent" if it does not contain a fact and its 
negation. 
DEFINITION: A database is "consistent" if the closure of its specific facts with respect o its 
deductive rules is consistent. 
DEFINITION: A set of specific facts Fs is "closed" with respect o Fg if it is equal to its own 
closure with respect o Fg. 
DEFINITION: A set of specific facts Fs "contradicts" a fact or rule f if 
(1) f is a specific fact and Fs contains its negation; or 
(2) f is of type I and Fs does not contain an instance of it; or 
(3) f is of type A and Fs either does not assert for any constant that it fulfills the subject 
of f or asserts for some constant that it fulfills the subject of f and not its predicate. 
DEFINITION: A database consisting of specific facts F~ and deductive rules F a "implies" a 
fact or rule f if there is no consistent superset of F, that is closed with respect o Fg and 
contradicts f. 
Note that the procedures in section 3, and the system in section 7.1, are limited to the 
equivalent of "definite deductive databases", i.e. only one relation in the predicate. This 
causes incompleteness with respect o the above semantics, in the treatment of explicit 
negation. For example, if a database contains the following facts: 
P(X) A (S(X) A MI(X)) 
7 P(X) A (S(X) ^ M2(X)) 
Mr(s) 
M2(s) 
then, by the semantics, it implies "7  S(s)"; a more general Aristotelian-logic database, 
that allows a disjunction of several relations in the predicate, could infer this conclusion, 
but the procedures in section 3, and the system in section 7.1, do not handle this case. 
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The procedures in section 3, and the system in section 7.1, are sound with respect o the 
semantics. The proof is by straightforward case analysis. 
The full thesis (Mozes, 1987) contains a brief discussion of the possibility for a complete 
formal semantics that would also express the special capabilities of the database. 
7.3. ALTERNATIVE AXIOMATISATION: REDUCTION OF THE FIGURES 
An alternative tothe axiomatisation in section 7. I is the doctrine of the reduction of the 
figures, originated by Aristotle himself. Aristotle viewed the first figure of the syllogism as 
the "perfect" figure, i.e. as the most natural expression ofall deduction. He therefore saw 
the four valid syllogisms of the first figure as the basic rules of deduction, to which 
syllogisms of other figures can be reduced. The reduction is either "direct", by 
conversions ofthe premises or the conclusion, or "indirect", by reductio ad absurdum. 
The rcduction of the figures is presented in detail by Joseph (1916), and is more recently 
presented in mathematical form by Corcoran (1973). 
Corcoran regards the reduction of the figures as "a natural deduction system", i.e. as a 
system in which deductive rules, rather than axioms, predominate. Note that the system 
in section 7.1 is also, by this definition, a natural deduction system. 
As noted above, the user interface of the database is based on Joseph's view, which 
differs from Aristotle in seeing each figure as rcprescnting a different form of reasoning, 
and therefore r gards the reduction of the figures as unnecessary. The reduction of the 
figures, like the system in section 7. I, captures only the deductive powers of Aristotelian 
logic, not the special capabilities it makes possible. 
Obviously, reduction of the figure loses the classification i to figures, by putting all 
syllogisms into the first figure. This means that the ability to structure the natural- 
language xplanations in the most natural way is lost; for example, in example 2 in 
section 5, the sentence "Mona Lisa can't be a man, because then it would be mortal" will 
be changed into "Because Mona Lisa is immortal, it is not a man"; in the same way, in 
example 5, the sentence "Some animal is not a man; for example, the dogs" will be 
changed into "Because some animal is a dog, it is not a man". The ability to point out 
instances for using analogy or induction is also lost. 
Again, if the validity of a syllogism isdetermined by the possibility of reduction, rather 
than by the list of restrictions, then the classification fthe fallacies, and with it the ability 
to point out possibilities, i  also lost. 
The special capabilities of the database show that Aristotelian logic is more than a 
natural deduction system--it s a system based on the principles of actual human thought, 
which therefore allows making the distinctions between forms of reasoning that are 
necessary for good interaction with human users. 
8. Implementation of the Prototype System 
Following is a brief discussion of the architecture and major 
implemented prototype system. 
algorithms of the 
8.1. OVERALL ARCHITECTURE 
The prototype system consists of three major modules: 
(1) Deduction--a module that searches the possible deduction paths, and records all 
paths leading to a conclusion that may interest he user. 
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(2) Record checking--a module that examines the records left by the deduction 
module, and uses them to answer the user's questions. 
(3) Natural-language explanation--a module that, given a deduction path, produces a
natural-language explanation of that path. 
The rest of the system contains straightforward outines that interact with the user, 
read his commands, and parse the queries. 
When accepting a new fact or rule into the database, the system always first runs the 
deduction module on it. If its contradictory can be deduced from the rest of the database, 
the user is notified and the fact or rule is rejected; if the fact or rule can itself be deduced, 
the user is warned and asked whether he still wants to enter it. This prevents 
inconsistencies, and discourages redundancies. 
Since this is a prototype system, no effort was spent on sophisticated storage of the 
database. The database consists of two files, one containing a list of the constants and 
relations, the other containing a list of the facts and rules; the two files are read into 
memory at the start of the run, and written back again at its end. 
The prototype was implemented in the C programming language. 
8.2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MAJOR ALGORITHMS 
8.2.1. Deduction 
The deduction module works by recursive depth-first search. Given a goal, the program 
finds what are the major and minor terms (respectively the predicate and subject of the 
goal; if the user gave a retrieval request, then a special minor term, that can match any 
constant, is used), and then goes over all possible major premises, i.e. all facts and rules 
that contain the major term. For each one, the program first decides whether it also 
contains the minor term (so an immediate inference can be tried); if not, it finds what is 
the middle term, and then looks for a fact or rule containing both the middle and minor 
term and tries to perform a syllogism; after that, the program decides on a sub-goal (i.e., 
finds what additional premise would, together with the major premise, allow deducing the 
goal), and goes on recursively. 
All deduction paths leading to a significant conclusion (the original goal, its negation, 
pointing it out as a possibility, or a stronger or weaker version) are recorded. Incomplete 
paths are also recorded. The search ends either when the search tree is exhausted or when 
a strongest possible path (one leading to a sure conclusion with universal quantity, or one 
proving a "no" answer) is found. 
In the cases handled by the database (no relations representing relationships between 
objects), there can be no valid deduction path using the same middle term, or the same 
premise, more than once; this is used to prune the search tree, by eliminating any branch 
using a middle term already used higher in the tree. This also prevents looping when the 
rules of the database contain cycles. 
Premises in which the subject has more than one relation can lead to a fork in the 
search, when that subject becomes the middle term. The search goes on separately for 
each of the relations in the subject (and can fork further ecursively); the record-checking 
module uses the results in each path of the fork to determine the total result. 
Ordinarily, the search goes only in the major-to-minor direction, i.e. the program 
generates a subgoal for each possible major premise. This is enough for all capabilities of 
the database xcept finding missing rules; missing rules can also be found when generating 
subgoals for possible minor premises, so finding them requires doing the search in both 
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directions at each level of the search tree (which can make the search exponentially 
slower). The user has to specify in advance, before a query, that he will want to ask for 
missing rules, and the search is then performed in both directions. 
The implementation is heuristic; it is sufficient for cases that will reasonably be needed 
by a human user, but is not meant o be complete with respect o Aristotelian logic. For 
example, from the facts: 
M3(X ) I (MI(X) A M2(X)) 
P(X) A (MI(X) ^  Me(X)) 
S(X) A (MI(X) ^  M3(X)) 
you can infer, in Aristotelian logic, or by the system in section 7.1, the conclusion 
"P(X) I S(X)", but the implemented prototype will not be able to infer it. A complete 
implementation would, if two terms overlap without any one of them containing the other 
(such as "MI(X)^M2(X)" and "MI(X)^M3(X)"), apply the deduction module 
recursively to try to prove a type I rule asserting the existence of objects fulfilling both 
terms (in this case, "Ma(X ) I (Mr(X) ^  M2(X))"), and, if successful, unify the two terms by 
narrowing both of them; this would make it possible to handle the above case. 
8.2.2. Natural-language explanations 
The natural-language explanation module accepts a deduction path and, going in the 
minor-to-major direction (the opposite of the direction in which the path was generated), 
builds a sequence of syllogisms. If this is an explanation of a possibility, it is broken into 
two sequences of syllogisms, and the results of the two sequences are then used in one 
syllogism committing the fallacy of the undistributed middle. 
The program keeps a set of string macros (implemented in C by calls to the "prinff" 
function, with arguments that are calls to various functions returning strings), one for 
each mood and figure that either are valid or commit the fallacy of the undistributed 
middle; the later macros contain the word "perhaps". For each syllogism, the appropriate 
macro is chosen, and is then filled in by the terms and by their pronouns, thus producing 
a natural-language sentence xplaining the syllogism. 
The full thesis (Mozes, 1987) contains implified pseudo-code listings of the deduction 
and natural-language explanation modules. 
9. Conclusion 
This paper presented a deductive database based on Aristotle's rules of the syllogism. It 
was demonstrated, both theoretically and by practical examples, that this database allows 
natural and informative interaction with the user, and that its unique capabilities in this 
area follow naturally from the use of Aristotelian logic. 
The main conclusion we can draw from this work is that the neglect of Aristotelian 
logic by computer scientists i unjustified, and that more work should be done using it in 
applications that require good user interaction and in AI applications. 
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